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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
prove to be the test phrase of that decision. The Court stated
that in Caban they were rejecting the notion that a "broad,
gender-based distinction. . is required by any universal dif-
ference between maternal and paternal relations at every
phase of a child's development." 77 The qualifier, "at every
phase of a child's development," may well indicate the Court's
reticence to grant many unwed fathers an equal voice in adop-
tion proceedings.
RONALD R. HOFER
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Polygraph Evidence - Im-
peachment of Polygraph Examiner Testimony by Defense
Experts Allowed at Admissibility Hearing. McLemore v.
State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979). In McLemore
v. State,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, where a
criminal defendant has stipulated to take a polygraph exami-
nation and the state has moved that those results and the
testimony of the examiner be admitted into evidence, the de-
fendant is entitled to present his own experts at the admissibil-
ity hearing, out of the presence of the jury, to impeach the
testimony of the polygraph examiner and the results of the
examination.
The question of whether a defendant can present his own
experts to testify against the polygraph examiner was first con-
sidered in State v. Mendoza.2 The court, reversing and remand-
ing on other grounds, there held that the "defendant's expert
witnesses may testify before the trial judge at a new admissibil-
77. 99 S. Ct. at 1754 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct. 1760, 1767 (1979))
(emphasis added).
EDITOR'S NoTE: After this article was prepared for publication the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals was faced with the issue of whether section 956.71 of the Wisconsin stat-
utes was unconstitutional because it categorizes fathers of children born out of wed-
lock and not legitimated as not being a "parent" within the meaning of this custody
statute. In upholding the statute, the Wisconsin Appeals Court echoed many of the
dissenting arguments in Caban. The court stated the interests of the state in protect-
ing minor children were substantial reasons for distinguishing the class. See State v.
Hill, 91 Wis. 2d 446, 283 N.W.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1979).
1. 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
2. 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977).
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ity hearing preceding the new trial. ' 3 However, it was not clear
whether that language was limited to the facts of Mendoza.
Moreover, the exact nature and scope of the defendant's right
to impeach was left undefined by Mendoza.
McLemore clearly delineates the defendant's right to call
his own experts. In addition, McLemore raises two other very
important questions with regard to polygraph evidence: (1)
should testimony of defense experts be admissible at trial, be-
fore the jury, to impeach the examiner's opinion; and (2)
should State v. Stanislawski4 be overruled, thereby prohibiting
the admissibility of any polygraph evidence at criminal trials?
These two questions, and the scope and nature of a defendant's
right to impeach the testimony of the examiner, will be ad-
dressed by this note.
I. BACKGROUND
The polygraph is a pneumatically operated, multipenned
instrument, which mechanically records blood pressure, pulse,
respiration, galvanic skin response and, in some cases, gross
muscular movement. 5 Simply stated, the theory behind poly-
graphy is that a person's fear of detection, when being inten-
tionally deceptive, manifests itself in certain physiological re-
sponses' which are recorded by the polygraph and interpreted
by the examiner. The polygraph examiner asks the suspect
certain questions, records the suspect's answers, and interprets
the correlating polygrams to determine if the suspect has given
any deceptive responses.
Until State v. Stanislawski7 was decided in 1974, the results
of polygraph examinations taken by criminal defendants, and
the polygraph examiner's interpretive testimony, were inad-
missible in all cases.8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State
3. 80 Wis. 2d at 162, 258 N.W.2d at 277. A new trial was ordered because of error
in jury instructions and improper change of venue.
4. 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
5. J. REm & F. INRAU, TRUTH AND DECErION: THE POLYGRAPH ("LiE-DgrEcrOR")
TECHNIQUE 5 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as REID & INBAU]. See Wilner,
Polygraphy: Short Circuit to Truth? 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 286 n.1 (1977).
6. Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, 2
POLYGRAPH 169, 194-95 (1973), quoted in Lhost v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 620, 642-43, 271
N.W.2d 121, 131-32 (1978).
7. 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974).
8. See, e.g., State v. Nemoir, 62 Wis. 2d 206, 214 N.W.2d 297 (1974).
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v. Bohner9 adopted the absolute inadmissibility position es-
poused in Frye v. United States" and adhered to it for more
than forty years." Then in Stanislawski the court rejected the
rationale of Bohner and adopted the Arizona position on poly-
graph evidence, which had been enunciated in State v.
Valdez. 12
Stanislawski held that expert opinion evidence as to poly-
graph examinations may be admitted in criminal cases to cor-
roborate other evidence of a defendant's participation in the
crime charged, and, if the defendant takes the stand, such
evidence may be admitted to corroborate or impeach his own
testimony. 3 Furthermore, Stanislawski made the admissibility
of polygraph evidence subject to four conditions:
First, the district attorney, defendant, and defense counsel
must all sign a written stipulation providing for defendant's
submission to the test, and for the admission at trial of the
graphs, and the examiner's opinion on behalf of either the
defendant or the state. Second, notwithstanding the stipula-
tion, the admissibility of the test results is subject to the
discretion of the trial judge, that is, if the trial judge is not
convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was
conducted under proper circumstances he may refuse to ac-
cept such evidence. Third, if the graphs and examiner's opin-
ion are offered in evidence, the opposing party has the right
to cross-examine the examiner about: his qualifications and
training; the conditions under which the test was adminis-
tered; the limitations of and possibilities for error in the tech-
nique of polygraphic interrogation; and, at the discretion of
the trial court, any other matters deemed pertinent to the
inquiry. Finally, if the evidence is admitted, the trial judge
should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does
not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with
which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indi-
cate whether at the time of the examination the defendant
9. 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933).
10. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye the court held that "the systolic blood
pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus
far made. Id. at 1014.
11. E.g., Gaddis v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 120, 216 N.W.2d 527 (1974); State v. Nemoir,
62 Wis. 2d 206, 214 N.W.2d 297 (1974).
12. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962) (en banc).
13. 62 Wis. 2d at 742, 216 N.W.2d at 14.
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was telling the truth. The jury members should also be in-
structed that it is for them to determine what corroborative
weight and effect such testimony should be given."
In State v. Mendoza the court clarified the second condition
of Stanislawski, holding that the trial court must conduct its
"judicial inquiry" out of the presence of the jury, in a "hearing
on admissibility" of polygraph evidence.' 5
Of those courts which admit polygraph examination results
and testimony into evidence, only a limited number do not
require a stipulation as a condition of admissibility.'" In Lhost
v. State, Wisconsin reaffirmed its position that, absent a
Stanislawski stipulation, polygraph evidence is not admissible
in a criminal trial .
The training of polygraph examiners has become increas-
ingly standardized. Expanded training programs and stricter
entrance requirements into schools and professional organiza-
tions have been developed recently. Advances have occurred in
both instrumentation and technique.'" Some states require that
polygraph examiners be licensed to practice, and require vary-
ing degrees of experience and training.'9 Wisconsin, however,
has no polygraph licensing statute, and any person who pur-
ports to be a polygraph examiner may practice as one. In the
future, regulation of training and procedure, and state licens-
ing of polygraph examiners in Wisconsin, may help to alleviate
some of the problems illustrated by the discussion of
McLemore below.
II. McLemore v. State
The defendant was charged with armed robbery of a gaso-
line station in violation of sections 943.32(1)(b) and (2) of the
1973 Wisconsin statutes. Before trial, and pursuant to a stipu-
lation between defense counsel and the assistant district attor-
14. McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 747, 275 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1979) (paraphras-
ing State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 742-43, 216 N.W.2d 8, 14 (1974)).
15. 80 Wis. 2d at 161, 258 N.W.2d at 277.
16. Lhost v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 620, 639, 271 N.W.2d 121, 130 (1978). See also
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974); State v.
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912 (1975).
17. 85 Wis. 2d 620, 271 N.W.2d 121 (1978).
18. Abrams, Polygraphy Today, 3 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 85, 87 (1977).
19. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 2412 (Smith-Hurd 1978); MICH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 338.1710 (1976).
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ney, the defendant submitted to a polygraph examination. The
examination was administered by Robert L. Anderson, a poly-
graph examiner for the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory in
Madison. At trial, the state called Mr. Anderson to the stand.
A hearing was held, outside the presence of the jury, at which
the court permitted examination regarding Mr. Anderson's
qualifications as a polygraph examiner. 2
Defense counsel then made an offer of proof that two de-
fense experts would testify that (1) the scoring of the defen-
dant's test followed no recognized or approved procedure; (2)
the test questions asked the defendant were improper; and (3)
the results of independent polygraph examinations conducted
by defense experts were inconclusive and did not show the
defendant to be deceptive." The trial court said the defense
could cross-examine Anderson before the jury, but denied the
defense motion to put on its experts to rebut Anderson's con-
clusions and qualifications.
Anderson was then called to testify in the presence of the
jury. He reiterated his testimony about his training and qualifi-
cations.Y Anderson then opined that based on polygraph exam-
ination the defendant was not telling the truth when he denied
robbing the gasoline station.
20. Anderson testified that he is a polygraph examiner at the State Crime
Laboratory, and that he has been a polygraph examiner since 1968 when he
finished the federal school at Augusta, Georgia. Before his present job, Mr.
Anderson testified that he had conducted more than 800 polygraph examina-
tions while he was in the Army. He added, that he had no way of knowing how
many of these examinations resulted in the actual taking of the polygram. He
testified that he had conducted more than 600 polygraph tests at the State
Crime Laboratory. He stated that he was a member of the American Polygraph
Association (APA), the Wisconsin Polygraph Association, and the Wisconsin
Law Enforcement Association.
Anderson stated he was placed on probation status with the APA, following
a hearing on charges brought against him. He stated that because of his role in
the Mendoza trial. . . , Robert Brisentine of the American Polygraph Associa-
tion filed charges against him. Brisentine alleged at the APA hearing that An-
derson had misinterpreted the charts in the Mendoza case, that the procedure
Anderson used for arriving at his conclusions was contrary to any recognized
teaching of an APA accredited school, and that the procedure used by Anderson
was not taught by the Army. He was still on APA probation at the time of this
trial.
87 Wis. 2d at 744-45, 275 N.W.2d at 694-95 (citations omitted).
21. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21, Brief of Defendant in Error at 3-4, McLemore
v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
22. Anderson's testimony included the circumstances surrounding his probationary
status with the American Polygraph Association. Id. at 746, 275 N.W.2d at 695.
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The jury found the defendant guilty, and judgment was
entered convicting the defendant of one count of armed robbery
contrary to sections 943.32(1)(b) and (2) of the 1973 Wisconsin
statutes. The defendant appealed the conviction, claiming,
inter alia, that the trial court's refusal to allow the use of de-
fense experts' rebuttal testimony at the voir dire examination
of Anderson and at trial constituted error in that the defendant
was denied the right to a fair trial and an opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses.m
The supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Day,
held that the defendant was entitled to introduce expert testi-
mony to impeach the examiner in the admissibility hearing,
out of the presence of the jury, challenging the methods and
techniques used in the examination. The court further held
that this right to impeach the examiner was not subject to the
discretion of the trial court, and the refusal by the trial court
to allow the defense to exercise this right was error requiring
reversal and a new trial.24
III. INTERPRETATION AND CRITIQUE
A. McLemore and its Impact
It is interesting to note that the Mendoza case is cited by
McLemore as deciding the question of whether a defendant
who stipulates to the admission of an examiner's opinion is
entitled to call his own expert witnesses to rebut that opinion.
Close analysis of the Mendoza opinion, however, shows that the
court there did not decide that question. Rather, all that the
Mendoza case stated was that the defendant's experts could
testify at a new admissibility hearing preceding defendant's
new trial.2 1 Mendoza did not state that this holding was to be
23. The issue on appeal, as stated by the supreme court, was: "[wias the defen-
dant denied the right to cross-examination, impeachment, and the right to call wit-
nesses in his own behalf when the trial court refused to allow him to call his own
polygraph experts to testify as to procedures used by the state's polygraph examiner?"
Id. at 742, 275 N.W.2d at 693-94.
24. Id. at 749, 275 N.W.2d at 697.
25. Id. at 747, 275 N.W.2d at 696 (citing State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258
N.W.2d 260 (1977)).
26. See text accompanying note 3 supra. As stated above, the Mendoza court
reversed and remanded on other grounds. Specifically, the trial court erred in ordering
a change of the place of trial sua sponte over defendant's timely objection. As to the




of general application to all polygraph evidence, and it did not
make clear the nature of the "right" it had made available to
that particular defendant.
In contrast, McLemore27 clearly explicates the scope and
nature of a defendant's right to call his own expert witnesses:
(1) The purported rule of Mendoza, i.e., that the defense may
present its own experts to impeach the agreed-upon polygraph
examiner at the admissibility hearing, is to be of general appli-
cation to all criminal cases involving a Stanislawski stipula-
tion; 1 (2) A defendant is entitled, as a matter of right, to call
his own expert witnesses at the admissibility hearing to im-
peach the methods and techniques used in the examination of
the defendant; 21 (3) This right is not subject to the discretion
of the trial court; 0 and (4) Refusal to permit defendant's ex-
perts to testify at the voir dire is reversible error.3 '
The holding in McLemore was an important and necessary
step in the evolution of polygraph evidence admissibility in
Wisconsin. It is well recognized that the polygraph examiner is
the most important element of any polygraph examination.32 It
is the individual examiner's subjective interpretation of the
polygraph charts which produces an opinion as to the truth or
falsity of the defendant's responses to the examiner's ques-
A majority of this court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to allow defendant's experts to testify before the jury. . . . Finally,
the court holds that defendant's expert witnesses may testify before the trial
judge at a new admissibility hearing preceding the new trial but that such
hearing need not be held if, prior to such hearing, the state and the defendant
mutually withdraw the stipulation to admission of the polygraph evidence.
State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 162, 258 N.W.2d 260, 277 (1977) (emphasis added).
From the above statement, it is not clear (1) whether the court's holding regarding
testimony of defense polygraph experts is to be of general applicability to all criminal
cases involving polygraph evidence; (2) whether defendants, as a matter of right, may
introduce rebuttal polygraph testimony at the admissibility hearing; and (3) what the
nature of the "right," if any, to introduce such testimony is.
27. 87 Wis. 2d at 749, 275 N.W.2d at 697.
28. "Stanislawski left unanswered the question of whether a defendant who stipu-
lates to the admission of an examiner's opinion is nevertheless entitled to call his own
expert witnesses to rebut that opinion. That question was decided in State v. Mendoza,
80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977)." McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 747, 275
N.W.2d 692, 696 (1979).
29. "[T]he defense was entitled to put on its experts to impeach Anderson in the
admissibility hearing .... " Id. at 749, 275 N.W.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See RaD & INhAu, supra note 5, at 5.
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tions.3 In addition, "'[w]hen polygraph evidence is offered in
evidence at trial, it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near
infallibility.' ,,3" Present day jurors are "'likely to give signifi-
cant, if not conclusive, weight to a polygraphist's opinion as to
whether the defendant is being truthful or deceitful in his re-
sponse to a question bearing on a dispositive issue in a criminal
case.' -3
Given the one-sided nature and effect of polygraph evidence
against a defendant,3 in order for the defendant to have a fair
trial, it is imperative that at some point in the trial process the
defendant be given an opportunity to confront the polygraph
expert testifying against him.37 Stanislawski provides the right
of cross-examination as one means of confronting the poly-
33. McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 749-50, 275 N.W.2d 692, 697 (1979) (citing
Abbell, Polygraph Evidence: The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal
Trials, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 29, 40, 41 (1977)). (This portion of the majority opinion
reflects the views of Justices Day, Connor T. Hansen and Callow that all polygraph
evidence should be inadmissible. It will be referred to hereinafter as the "minority"
opinion.) See also United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512 (D. Md. 1973)
(unusual responsibility placed on examiner).
34. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 22-23, McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275
N.W.2d 692 (1979) (quoting United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.
1975)).
35. Id. at 23.
36. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
37. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. . . ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. These rights were made obliga-
tory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400 (1965) (right of confrontation), and in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(right to compulsory process).
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (involving the right of an accused
murderer to confront and cross-examine a person who confessed to the murder, but
later repudiated the confession, and the right of the accused to introduce the testi-
mony of three witnesses to whom the other person confessed) stated the following with
regard to an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own
behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black,
writing for the Court in In re Oliver. . . identified these rights as among the
minimum essentials of a fair trial:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity
to be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in our system
of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine
the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.
Id. at 294 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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graph witness.i However, many times the complexities of the
polygraph examination may render cross-examination an inef-
fective alternative." Therefore, it is essential to due process
that the defendant be entitled to call expert witnesses in his
own behalf to challenge the testimony of the polygraph exam-
iner.4° Providing for the defense to put on its own experts to
impeach the examiner at the admissibility hearing, as
McLemore does, gives the defense a limited4' right to present
expert witnesses in its own behalf, and serves to assist the trial
court in exercising its discretion to admit or withhold the poly-
graph evidence at trial, pursuant to Stanislawski.2
B. Should Expert Rebuttal Testimony be Admissible at
Trial?
At trial in McLemore, out of the presence of the jury, the
defendant offered to have his own experts testify before the jury
38. 62 Wis. 2d at 742-43, 216 N.W.2d at 14.
39. It is . . . unfair to expect the defense attorney to be able to exercise the
defendant's right to cross-examine to its fullest. Few attorneys know as much
about polygraph examination as do the experts they try to interrogate. The
polished and experienced expert witness can easily anticipate and outfox the
non-expert.
Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 24, McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692
(1979).
40. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). "Few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense." Id. at
302 (citations omitted).
"The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance,
if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront
the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he
has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a
fundamental element of due process of law."
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967), quoted in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95,
98 (1972).
Although these statements of the Court were not made with respect to fact situa-
tions involving the defense use of expert witnesses, the rationale behind the principles
stated applies with equal force and validity to the right to present testimony of defense
experts.
41. The defense's right to present its own expert witness to impeach the testimony
of the examiner is "limited" in that the defense may only present its experts at the
admissibility hearing and not at trial before the jury.
42. Stanislawski provides that "notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility
of the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial court, i.e., if the trial judge is
not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test was conducted under
proper conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence." 62 Wis. 2d at 742, 216
N.W.2d at 14 (footnote omitted).
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to impeach the testimony of the polygraph examiner. The trial
court refused the defendant's offer. On appeal, although the
defendant raised the issue, the supreme court did not directly
address whether the refusal to allow defense experts to testify
at trial was error. The only statement made by the court with
regard to this issue was a reference to the holding in Mendoza:41
"A four member majority of this court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant's
experts to testify before the jury."" A three member minority
in Mendoza would have held that the trial court did abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow defendant to call expert wit-
nesses to impeach the examiner's opinion before the jury.45
It has already been noted that there is a significant need for
a defendant to confront the testimony of the polygraph exam-
iner with experts of his own.4" McLemore provides for such a
confrontation at the admissibility hearing, outside the presence
of the jury. But, given the overwhelming and conclusive effect
the testimony of a polygraph examiner can have on a jury,47 is
the admissibility hearing a sufficient protection of the defen-
dant's due process right to a "fair opportunity to defend
against the state's accusations"? 4" That is, should the defen-
dant be given some opportunity to present experts of his own
at trial to rebut the testimony of the examiner?
This is a difficult question, 4 dealing with a unique subject, 0
43. 80 Wis. 2d at 162, 258 N.W.2d at 278.
44. McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 748, 275 N.W.2d 692, 696 (1979).
45, 80 Wis. 2d at 162-63, 258 N.W.2d at 277-78. The minority, Justices Day, Heffer-
nan and Abrahamson, argued that polygraph testimony should be treated the same
as other forms of expert testimony, i.e., it should be subject to impeachment by other
expert testimony. The "discerning judgment of the jury" and the vigorous exercise of
discretion by the trial court, it was argued, could adequately serve as a safeguard to
overcome or prevent a "battle of experts." This portion of the majority opinion will be
referred to as the "minority" opinion.
46. See text accompanying notes 32-40 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
48. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973): "The right of an accused in
a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend
against the state's accusations." Id. at 294.
49. The difficulty of this question stems, in part, from the lack of precedent on this
question. The writer was unable to find any appellate decision directly on point. But
see Galloway v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 974 (1976)
(indicating that in cases where the absence of the defendant's expert testimony to
impeach the polygraph examiner at trial is prejudicial to him, such testimony should
be admitted); see also Brief of Appellant and Cross-Respondent at 30 n.14, State v.
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977) (discussing the practice in Arizona
[Vol. 63:143
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and involving important competing interests. On the one hand
are the constitutional rights of the defendant to due process
and a fair trial." "The rights to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long
been recognized as essential to due process. 5 2 In addition, the
defendant has a constitutional right to a jury trial.53 This right
encompasses "the common sense and collective judgment of
his peers, derived after weighing facts and considering the cred-
ibility of witnesses. "54 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has also
indicated that a defendant has a right to challenge testimony
of state experts by introducing contrary evidence from his own
experts. 5
of permitting defense expert testimony to impeach polygraph examiner's opinion at
trial).
50. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1975), finds polygraph
evidence to be distinguishable from other types of scientific evidence. Accord, United
States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 512-14 (D. Md. 1973).
51. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). It is possible to waive funda-
mental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (recognizing
that the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel can be waived by an accused).
However, to be effective, a waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntary, knowing
'and intelligent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), cited with approval in
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
973 (1976). Since a polygraph examination cannot be administered without full cooper-
ation of the defendant, it is possible that "the mere taking of the examination is
tantamount to a waiver of constitutional rights if adequate warnings are given." 525
F.2d at 735-36 (emphasis added).
The state argued in McLemore that the stipulation entered into by the defendant
waived any constitutional right to present expert witnesses in his behalf that defendant
might have had. Brief of Defendant in Error at 9. But, as the defendant pointed out,
the stipulation dealt only with admissibility, not with cross-examination, impeach-
ment or contradiction. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21. Furthermore, if the stipulation
were meant to waive any rights other than the right to object to the admissibility of
polygraph evidence, inadequate warnings were given under Miranda to make the
waiver effective.
52. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (emphasis added).
53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that the sixth amend-
ment right to a jury trial in criminal cases is obligatory on the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
54. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
It was argued by the defendant on appeal that exclusion of the defense expert's rebut-
tal testimony removes the function of weighing the evidence from the jury and thus
denies the defendant his right to a jury trial. Reply Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 3,
McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
55. Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 274, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1973) held that
testimony of the state's witness, identifying chin hair found at scene of crime as that
of the defendant, "was a matter of expert testimony that could be challenged by cross-
examination or by impeaching evidence, either from other [defense] experts or from
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On the other hand is the state's interest in assuring both
fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and inno-
cence." This requires the accused, in the exercise of his rights,
to comply with established rules of procedure and evidence. 7
Therefore, in appropriate cases, a defendant's rights may have
to bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the trial
process.56 The major interest of the state in barring defense
expert rebuttal testimony at trial is to prevent misleading the
jury, confusing the issues, and wasting time.-9 Specific prob-
lems that may arise if defense expert testimony to impeach the
examiner is permitted are: (1) the potential for transforming a
criminal trial into a "battle of experts"; (2) the possibility that
the central issue before the jury may become the reliability of
the polygraph rather than the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant; and (3) the appearance that the polygraph examiner is
on trial rather than the defendant."
The state's concern with the fair and orderly conduct of
trials is reflected in statutory evidentiary rules. Briefly stated,
some of the applicable rules are as follows: (1) Generally, all
relevant' evidence is admissible;12 (2) Expert testimony is
admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;" (3) Expert opinion
treatises." See also Milbauer v. Transport Employes' Mut. Ben. Soc'y, 56 Wis. 2d 860,
867, 203 N.W.2d 135, 139 (1973), stating, in the context of a civil action, that "[a]
party may offer conflicting evidence through other experts even if the other party's
expert is well-qualified."
56. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
57. Id. at 302.
58. Id. at 295. It should be noted that where constitutional rights directly affecting
the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, rules of procedure and evidence should not
be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Cf. 410 U.S. at 302 (conflict
between application of hearsay rule and due process rights).
59. See Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1977). See also Brief of Defendant in Error at 4-5,
McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
60. Brief of Defendant in Error at 4-5, McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275
N.W.2d 692 (1979).
61. "Relevant evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." Wis. STAT. § 904.01 (1977) (emphasis
added).
62. Wis. STAT. § 904.02 (1977). This general rule is subject, of course, to Wis. STAT.
§ 904.03 (1977), which provides that "relevant evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
63. Wis. STAT. § 907.02 (1977).
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testimony on an ultimate issue is not objectionable;64 and (4)
A party has a right to introduce evidence relevant to weight or
credibility.15
After considering the competing interests outlined above,6
the holding of McLemore, entitling the defense to introduce
expert testimony to impeach the polygraph examiner at the
admissibility hearing, alone, is insufficient to protect the due
process right of the defendant. First, the rights of the defendant
to due process (including the rights to confront and cross-
examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own behalf),
a fair trial, and a jury trial, can be adequately protected only
if the defendant is given an opportunity to rebut and impeach
the testimony of the examiner at trial in the presence of the
jury with his own expert testimony. 7 The unchallenged testi-
mony of a polygraph examiner can have an overwhelming and
conclusive effect on a jury. 8 If precluded from hearing both
sides of expert testimony on the polygraph examination of the
defendant, the jury is hindered in performing its rightful role
as the trier of fact.6 Defense counsel may be unable to effec-
tively cross-examine the polished and experienced polygraph
examiner. 0 Therefore, the rebuttal testimony of the defen-
dant's own experts is necessary to confront the expert witness
against the defendant.
Second, other kinds of expert testimony may be impeached
by the opposing party's own experts at trial.7 Although poly-
graph testimony is unique among other types of scientific evi-
dence,72 admitting expert rebuttal testimony regarding poly-
graph evidence does not deviate from present practice with
respect to expert testimony. Indeed, such an approach would
64. Wis. STAT. § 907.04 (1"977).
65. Wis. STAT. § 901.04(5) (1977).
66. See text accompanying notes 51-65 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
68. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975).
69. Cf. id. (holding polygraph evidence not stipulated to inadmissible). It can
further be argued that the defendant is deprived of his right to a jury trial because
the jury is prevented from deciding credibility and how much weight to give the
evidence. Reply Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 3, McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739,
275 N.W.2d 692 (1979).
70. See note 39 supra.
71. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 274, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1974).
72. United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1975).
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be in line with the general rule now followed as to expert testi-
mony?3
Both the defendant's need to present the testimony of his
own experts to preserve certain rights and the dangers inherent
in the presentation of such testimony are interests of signifi-
cant weight. Some provision must be made for the defendant
to present his own experts, at trial, before the jury, subject to
safeguards designed to protect the trial from becoming a
"battle of experts." This is not a situation where the rights of
a defendant must be completely overridden to accommodate a
legitimate interest of the state. Less severe alternatives exist
which protect the defendant's rights and which, at the same
time, insure that the state's interest in the fair and reliable
ascertainment of guilt is preserved.
Two possible solutions74 have been suggested by precedent.
The first, and more conservative, approach is loosely based on
Galloway v. Brewer.75 It would provide that, after hearing the
proffered testimony of the defendant's experts at the admissi-
bility hearing, the trial court determine whether such testi-
mony should be admissible at trial .7 The test for admissibility
would be: Does the admissible evidence produced by defen-
dant's experts at voir dire have such probative value regarding
the polygraph examination results and the examiner's testi-
mony that its absence from trial would result in a deprivation
of due process to the defendant? 7 This approach serves to bal-
73. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 264, 274, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1974).
74. Two other possible approaches might be the following: (1) The defense may
present experts at trial to rebut the examiner's testimony only if provided for in the
stipulation on admissibility; (2) The defense may present experts at trial to rebut the
examiner's testimony, subject to the applicable rules of evidence, unless it has agreed
otherwise in the stipulation on admissibility.
75. 525 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 974 (1976). Upon appeal
from a state trial court's placing of limitations on admissibility of polygraph evidence,
the 8th circuit ordered the district court to hold a hearing, at which the defendant was
to be allowed to present the testimony of an expert of his choosing to rebut the testi-
mony of the examiner at trial. The appeals court further ordered that if, after conduct-
ing the hearing, the district court found that the admissible evidence so produced was
of such probative value that its absence from the previous trial of defendant resulted
in prejudice to him, then the district court was to order the state to retry defendant
and permit the introduction of such polygraph testimony at the new trial.
76. See id.
77. The use of the standard "deprivation of due process" is based on the general
rule in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973), that the right to call wit-
nesses in one's own behalf is essential to due process. The rest of the test is derived
from Galloway v. Brewer, 525 F.2d at 371.
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ance the competing interests of the state and the defendant. By
limiting the use of the defense expert's testimony only to situa-
tions where it is essential to due process, testimony of lesser
probative value is prevented from misleading the jury, confus-
ing the issues, or wasting time. However, where doubts exist as
to whether exclusion-of the testimony at trial will deprive the
defendant of due process, they should be resolved in favor of
the defendant.
The second alternative would permit defense experts to tes-
tify at trial before the jury, subject to the evidentiary rules
governing expert testimony.78 The state's interest in a fair and
orderly trial would be protected by careful application of sec-
tion 904.03 of the Wisconsin statutes and by a judicious appli-
cation of the court's "discretion" to admit or withhold poly-
graph evidence under Stanislawski. The "minority" opinion79
in Mendoza clearly sets forth the respective roles of the trial
court and the jury, and the treatment to be given such evi-
dence.
The state's complaint that such testimony may lead to a
battle of experts may be true. But this problem is present in
every area of expert testimony and the best solution is the
discerning judgment of the jury. The trial court may exercise
its discretion vigorously to prevent cumulative testimony or
digressions. A court may, in addition, excuse the jury at any
time and reassert its prerogative to take evidence and exer-
cise its discretion to exclude the polygraph evidence entirely.
But where . . . the offer of extrinsic evidence goes to the
heart of the issue of whether the examination was properly
administered and the data properly interpreted, a minority
of this court would hold the proponent of such evidence must
be given some latitude."0
78. See Brief of Appellant and Cross-Respondent at 30 n.14, Mendoza v. State, 80
Wis. 2d 122, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977). Apparently, this is the procedure in Arizona, the
state from which the Stanislawski rule was adopted. State of Ariz. v. Samuel Pete, No.
CR-77905 (Sup. Ct., State of Ariz., County of Maricopa) (cited in Brief of Appellant
and Cross-Respondent, id.) is illustrative of lower court decisions in which testimony
of a defense expert was admitted to rebut the examiner's testimony. But see State v.
Seebold, 111 Ariz. 423, 531 P.2d 1130 (1975) (holding that there was no error in the
trial court's exclusion at trial of evidence of a polygraph examination of defendant,
taken by an independent examiner, to impeach the testimony regarding the stipulated
polygraph examination).
79. See note 45 supra.
80. 80 Wis. 2d at 163, 258 N.W.2d at 278.
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In the future, these alternatives will be available for the Wis-
consin Supreme Court to consider.
C. Should Stanislawski be Overruled?
A three-member minority of the court in McLemore81 stated
that it would overrule the court's previous holding in
Stanislawski.82 Further, on retrial of the McLemore case, the
minority would hold that none of the testimony or evidence as
to the polygraph examination would be admissible. The minor-
ity concluded "that polygraphy in its present state may be
useful as an investigative tool, but its limitations and potential
for misleading fact finders are such that it should not be a part
of our evidentiary system." Generally stated, the minority
presents two major reasons for its holding. First, the minority
does not believe that "the search for truth" in a criminal trial
should be left to the subjective, and, therefore, possibly inac-
curate interpretation of scientific data (polygraph examination
results), by an "artist" (the polygraph examiner), as opposed
to a scientist. 4 Second, the dissent points out the dangers that
the jury may be misled in relying too heavily on the expert
opinion of the examiner regarding the defendant's truthfulness,
that the issues will be confused, and that too much time will
be consumed by polygraph evidence. 5
While these objections to admissibility of polygraph evi-
dence have some merit, countervailing circumstances and safe-
guards outweigh them and make the admissibility of polygraph
evidence desirable. First, polygraph evidence is by no means
the sole or primary determinant in the "search for truth" in a
criminal trial. By the very terms of Stanislawski, polygraph
evidence is limited to playing a corroborative or impeachment
role.86 This requires that other evidence of guilt or innocence be
first introduced before any polygraph evidence is admissible.
Second, sufficient safeguards exist in the trial process to pre-
81. 87 Wis. 2d at 749-51, 275 N.W.2d at 697-98 (the "minority" opinion).
82. 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974) (holding polygraph evidence to be admissi-
ble in criminal trials in Wisconsin, subject to certain conditions, one of which being
that all parties sign a written stipulation as to admissibility).
83. 87 Wis. 2d at 751, 275 N.W.2d at 698.
84. 87 Wis. 2d at 749-50, 275 N.W.2d at 697 (citing Abbell, Polygraph Evidence:
The Case Against Admissibility in Federal Criminal Trials, 15 Am. CaM. L. REv. 29
(1977)).
85. 87 Wis. 2d at 751, 275 N.W.2d at 697-98.
86. 62 Wis. 2d at 742, 216 N.W.2d at 14.
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vent inaccurate interpretations of examination results from
reaching the jury or from going unnoticed by the jury. For
example, at the voir dire of the polygraph examiner, the defen-
dant is entitled to introduce experts of his own to impeach the
examiner's interpretation of the polygrams.17 If the trial judge
is not convinced that the examiner is qualified or that the test
was conducted under proper conditions, he may refuse to admit
such evidence." Once at trial, the defense may cross-examine
the polygraph examiner as to his qualifications, methods and
techniques." During the trial, the jury determines what weight
and credibility to give to the examiner's conclusions; at all
times, the trial court may, in its discretion, admit or exclude
evidence. 0
Third, adequate safeguards exist to prevent misleading the
jury, confusing the issues, or wasting time. An objection on
such grounds is available to either party throughout the pro-
ceedings.9' And, as mentioned above, the trial court may, at
any time, vigorously exercise its discretion to prevent cumula-
tive testimony and digressions.2
Finally, there are several policy reasons which mandate
that Stanislawski be retained in Wisconsin. (1) The stipulation
to admit polygraph evidence has utility. For the defendant who
is innocent, it provides a means by which he may overcome
substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt.9 3 For the prosecu-
tion, it aids in obtaining confessions from guilty defendants."
(2) When administered by competent, experienced examiners,
the polygraph has a high degree of accuracy and reliability. 5
87. 87 Wis. 2d at 749, 275 N.W.2d at 697 (1979).
88. 62 Wis. 2d at 742, 216 N.W.2d at 14 (1974).
89. Id. at 742-43, 216 N.W.2d at 14.
90. State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 163, 258 N.W.2d 260, 278 (1977) ("minority"
opinion). See also note 62 supra.
91. Wis. STAT. § 904.03 (1977).
92. State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 163, 258 N.W.2d 260, 278 (1977) ("minority"
opinion). See also note 62 supra.
93. REn & INBAU, supra note 5, at 297, 299. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (the first recorded case dealing with admissibility of deception
detection evidence). In Frye, the appeals court affirmed the district court's holding
sustaining the government's objection to the admissibility of a crude lie detection test
exculpating defendant. The defendant was convicted of second degree murder. Three
years later, another person confessed to the murder and the defendant was released.
E. BLOCK, L DErToRs: THEm HISTORY AND UsE 26 (1977).
94. See, e.g., McAdoo v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 596, 223 N.W.2d 521 (1974).
95. REn & INBAU, supra note 5, at 365. For a good survty of sources on the accuracy
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(3) Both parties should be allowed to stipulate to the admissi-
bility of evidence, including polygraph evidence." (4) Either
the defense or the prosecution may prevent admissibility of
polygraph evidence by refusing to stipulate thereto.17
Given already existing safeguards, and considering that po-
lygraph evidence is only admissible upon agreement of all the
parties, Stanislawski and its progeny provide a fair and equita-
ble solution to the question of polygraph evidence admissibil-
ity. Therefore, Stanislawski should not be overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
McLemore v. State represents an important and necessary
contribution to the law on polygraph evidence in Wisconsin.
The court defined and clarified a defendant's right to call his
own polygraph expert at the admissibility hearing in order to
impeach the testimony of the polygraph examiner. This rule is
supported by a defendant's right to cross-examine and impeach
prosecution witnesses, as well as by his right to call witnesses
in his own behalf. The rationale of McLemore applies with
equal force in the context of the jury trial itself. The jury is the
trier of fact and should be permitted to weigh the conflicting
testimony of polygraph experts. However, the trial court must
insure that the trial does not become a "battle of experts,"
confusing the issues and wasting time. These dangers, however,
exist with the use of all expert testimony and sufficient safe-
guards are available to prevent such occurrences. There are
workable alternative procedures which would permit the use,
at trial, of testimony from opposing polygraph experts. As an
individual's freedom is at stake in a criminal trial, constitu-
tional guarantees of due process would seem to mandate the
admissibility of testimony offered by defense polygraph ex-
perts.
McLemore also continues a movement by a minority of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to abolish the admissibility of poly-
and reliability of polygraph examinations, see Abrams, Polygraphy Today, 3 NAT'L J.
CRIM. DEF. 85, 90-92 (1977).
96. Stipulating to the admissibility of polygraph evidence is tantamount to an
evidentiary waiver of objections to admissibility. Lhost v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 620, 646,
271 N.W.2d 121, 133 (1978). If a person wants to waive his right to object to the
admissibility of polygraph evidence, he should be allowed to do so. See generally
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
97. See State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 741, 216 N.W.2d 8, 14 (1974) (requir-
ing that all parties sign stipulations before polygraph evidence is admissible).
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graph testimony. That drastic step may be unwarranted. Poly-
graph evidence is subject to criticism because it depends upon
the subjective interpretation of data by a human being and
thus may be subject to error. However, the same criticism may
be made of any kind of evidence involving human perception
and judgment. The solution to the problem is not to prohibit
the admission of polygraph evidence. Rather, existing rules of
evidence should be utilized, and new safeguards developed if
necessary, so that only the most trustworthy and reliable evi-
dence will be presented to the trier of fact.
LEONARD M. HicKEY
EDITOR'S NoTS: After this article was prepared for publication, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals decided State v. Craft, 93 Wis. 2d 55, 286 N.W.2d 619 (Ct. App. 1979). Therein
it was decided that the trial court properly excluded the results of a polygraph exami-
nation where the stipulation as to admissibility was signed only by the prosecutor and
the suspect who was not represented by counsel.
It was stated in Craft that a "defendant or suspect must be represented, and his
counsel must join with the defendant and the prosecutor in signing the stipulation for
admission of polygraph testimony into evidence at a subsequent trial." Id. at 61, 286
N.W.2d at 621. The court also intimated that a defendant could make a knowing and
voluntary waiver of counsel before signing the stipulation. Id. However in Craft the
court found insufficient evidence of a waiver of counsel by the defendant.
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